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Abstract—Femtocells are widely recognized as a promising 
technology to meet the requirements of indoor coverage in 
forthcoming fifth generation cellular networks (5G). As 
femtocell holders (FHs) can be users themselves or mobile 
network operators, it makes challenges to holistic network 
resource utilization. In particular, due to the selfishness nature, 
FHs are usually unwilling to accommodate extra users without 
compensation. This inspires us to develop an effective 
refunding mechanism, with aim to allow competitive network 
operators to employ truthful refunding policy, and to 
encourage FHs to make appropriate access permission. In this 
paper, we first define a refunding strategy function and price-
coefficient for the refunding policy. We then formulate the 
access permission as a Stackelberg game and theoretically 
prove the existence of unique Nash Equilibrium. Numerical 
results validate the effectiveness of our proposed mechanism 
and overall network efficiency is improved significantly as 
well. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The explosive mobile traffic poses an enormous 
challenge to the next generation mobile communication 
system (5G) in recent years [1]. It is also challenging for 
mobile cellular networks to provide efficient high-speed 
indoor data transmissions due to precious radio resources 
and poor coverage in some typical technical scenarios of 5G 
[2], which may lead to poor user quality of experience (QoE) 
and affect the income of mobile network operators (MNOs). 
Recently, small cell technology including microcell, 
picocell and femtocell, has been explored as a cost-efficient 
solution to improve indoor coverage and data rate. On the 
other hand, mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) 
have been emerging to enhance network resource utilization 
by wholesaling spare resource of MNOs to provide wireless 
access service. Being short of network infrastructure, 
MVNOs should prefer employing small cells to acquire 
network resources rather than only wholesaling.  
Compared with other small cells, femtocell is more 
preferable to MNOs and MVNOs because of the easy-
configuration. Femtocell holders (FHs), who can be 
individual users or network operators, may place femtocell 
anywhere and configure the operation mode arbitrarily [3]. 
Femtocell has three operation modes including open access, 
closed access and hybrid access [4]. In order to exclusively 
utilize femtocell, FHs usually prefer closed mode. Hence, it 
is necessary for MNOs and MVNOs who want to exploit 
the access resource of femtocells, to make economic 
strategy to motivate FHs to adopt hybrid mode.  
  Existing research work has proved that auction 
mechanism and game theory are efficient tools to encourage 
FHs to share femtocells for user access. The authors in [5] 
proposed a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction based 
incentive framework for the trade of access time between 
femtocells and mobile user equipments (MUEs). However, 
in real markets, MUEs prefer to authorize their served 
network operators rather than themselves to make the deal 
with FHs. The authors in [6] developed a reverse auction 
framework to motivate access permission trading of 
femtocells in network operator’s perspective. However, the 
truthfulness of this modified auction is not proved strictly, 
and the participating agent is able to cheat. Hence, the 
authors in [7] proposed a utility-aware refunding framework 
to solve access trading between single wireless service 
provider (WSP) and FHs in hybrid access femtocell 
network based on Stackelberg game analysis. However, the 
study on access permission in femtocell network with 
multiple network operators is more meaningful. 
Furthermore, the refunding policy of network operators can 
be distinct with each other by taking into account the 
objective CAPEX (capital expenditure) and OPEX 
(operating expenditure) besides the user churn rate that is 
considered only in [7]. The work in [8] [9] just analyzed the 
economic effects of deploying and sharing femtocells by 
network operators, and gave the cost expression.  
In this paper, we are focused on the competition with 
virtualized access resources between multiple network 
operators in hybrid femtocell network, which intervenes 
FHs in making access permission. Specifically, we consider 
a pair of typical competitors, i.e. MNO and MVNO, in our 
system model. Obviously, once MNO and MVNO fall into 
irrational competition, FHs probably admit excessive users 
who are not qualified to be served. Under this circumstance, 
it is imperative to develop an effective mechanism to 
motivate every participant to make reasonable decision in 
access permission game. This is essential to retain network 
operation stability and improve network resource utilization. 
We first investigate refunding policy of MNO and 
MVNO, and define a refunding strategy function (RSF) to 
reflect the characteristics of refund compensation for 
sharing resources. Moreover, we define price-coefficient as 
the strategy form in RSF to specify strategy selection. 
Considering operators offer the amount of refunds before 
the access resource allocation of the FH, we formulate the 
femtocell access permission as a Stackelberg game. We 
prove the existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium 
(NE) of the game. When equilibrium is achieved, the access 
resources are appropriately allocated as every participant is 
satisfied with allocation scheme to maximize their own 
utilities. Meanwhile, every participant is qualified to select 
unique appropriate strategy and unwilling to change, 
leading to stable access resource utilization and thus overall 
high network efficiency. Besides, we suggest a practical 
method to implement the game based access permission. 
We conduct simulation experiments to evaluate the 
proposed access permission scheme. Numerical results 
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show that every participant can maximize their utilities 
when each other selects rational strategy, and overall 
network efficiency is improved significantly as well.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
describes system model. Section III gives the definition of 
RSF and price-coefficient, and formulates the access 
permission problem. In Section IV, we employ Stackelberg 
game to model the access permission and prove the 
existence of unique Nash Equilibrium. We present the 
implementation of our proposed Stackelberg game based 
access permission scheme in Section V. Section VI presents 
the numerical results and discussions. We finally conclude 
the paper in Section VII. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we consider a femtocell network, where 
MNO and MVNO employ refunding policy to compensate 
the FH to provide indoor access service for their users. We 
present the network model and refunding model 
respectively. 
A. Network Model
In the femtocell network shown in Fig. 1, there is a femto
access point (FAP) that is configured to operate in hybrid 
access mode by the FH. The FH authorizes subscribed user 
equipments (SUEs) to access the FAP.  
Fig. 1. Illustration of  femtocell network shared by two network operators 
Considering the multiple radio access technology (Multi-
RAT) in next generation mobile communication system 
(5G) can be virtualized to pose a unified resources pool, we 
assume that the access resources of the FAP are divided into 
resource blocks rather than specific time-slots or frequency 
bands, to be allocated to users for access. Denote by p  the 
number of served SUEs, and by iβ the fraction of access 
resources to ith SUE. Therefore, the total amount of access 
fractions for served SUEs can be represented 
as
1
p
i pi
β Φ
=
= . In order to attain higher SINR, macrocell
user equipments of MNO (T-MUEs) and macrocell user 
equipments of MVNO (V-MUEs) may move into the 
femtocell. MNO and MVNO are willing to pay refunds for 
access resources of FAP to their users for data transmission. 
If having spare resource, FH may control FAP to allocate 
spare network resources to T-MUEs and V-MUEs. The total 
amount of access fractions for served T-MUEs and served 
V-MUEs can also be represented by
1
m
i mi
γ Φ
=
=
and
1
n
i ni
δ Φ
=
=  respectively, where m  and n  denote the
number of T-MUEs and V-MUEs respectively. iγ  and iδ  
represent the fraction of access resources allocated to ith T-
MUE and ith V-MUE respectively. As all the access 
resources are allocated to each participant, we have 
1p m nΦ Φ Φ+ + = . 
Furthermore, we assume that macrocells and femtocells 
operate on different spectrum bands. The interference of 
femtocell is only introduced by neighboring femtocells who 
share the same spectrum. ( )totI X  represents the total 
interference power, which is a function of the number of 
neighbors X . Hence the SINR of a UE is given by 
   2
0 ( )
n
i i
tot
P Sd h
N I X
η − =  
+ 
 ,  (1) 
where P  is the transmission power of FAP, 0N  is the 
Gaussian noise, S  is the log-normal shadowing component, 
id  is the distance between ith UE and FAP, n  is the path 
fading exponent, h is the Rayleigh-distributed fading 
magnitude, satisfying 2( ) 1E h =  . 
Without loss of  generality, we normalize the channel 
bandwidth, and then the capacity of ith UE is given by:  
( )2log 1i iC η= + .  (2) 
As FAP may provide a fixed SINR to different types of 
served user equipment such as SUE, T-MUE and V-MUE, 
we define threshold of SINR as basic service quality for 
them and compute their aggregated data rate respectively by 
multiplying allocated fractions and channel capacity as: 
  ( )2log 1FH p Fτ Φ η= + ,         (3) 
( )2log 1MNO m Mτ Φ η= + ,       (4) 
( )2log 1MVNO n Vτ Φ η= + ,        (5) 
where Fη is the threshold of SUEs, Mη is the threshold of
T-MUEs, Vη is the threshold of V-MUEs.
B. Refunding Model
With strong wish to improve indoor transmission data
rate, network operators are willing to trade the money 
directly for spare resources of femtocell as long as higher 
indoor rate brings more income. An FH is likely to get extra 
earnings from operators to compensate the investment on 
equipment in case of bringing no serious degradation to the 
communication service for the subscribers. Obviously, it is 
a win-win situation for operators and FHs. In the refunding, 
operators first consider the benefits from the trade. If the 
income from indoor UEs is larger than the refunds 
compensated to the FH, operators initiate access request, 
vice versa. We define the utility function of operators as: 
  ( )ω Φ η= + −2log 1MNO M m M MNOU R ,             (6) 
   ( )ω Φ η= + −2log 1MVNO V n V MVNOU R ,          (7) 
where ωM  denotes the equivalent revenue the MNO 
receives on unit data rate from T-MUEs admitted by FAP; 
ωV  denotes the equivalent revenue the MVNO receives on 
unit data rate from V-MUEs admitted by FAP; MNOR
denotes the refunds the MNO pays to FH; MVNOR  denotes the 
refunds the MVNO pays to FH. 
On the other hand, we define the utility function of FH 
as: 
( )ω Φ η= + + +2log 1FH F p F MNO MVNOU R R .   (8)
 (8) includes three parts: the first part is the income from 
innate FAP service, where ωF  denotes the equivalent 
revenue the FH receives on unit data rate from SUEs. The 
rest two parts are the refunds gained from MNO and 
MVNO respectively.  
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION OF REFUNDING POLICY  
In this section, we define a refunding strategy function 
(RSF) to describe the relationship between refunding 
amount and attained resources. We also propose price-
coefficient to reflect the strategy space for network 
operators, followed by the formulation of access permission 
problem. 
A. Problem Description 
Due to selfishness nature, both MNO and MVNO may 
pursue utility maximization by paying refunds in exchange 
for indoor access resources. Meanwhile, they are supposed 
to offer appropriate amount of refunds in a rational way 
when knowing no more information about opponent’s 
strategy. A reasonable approach of designing refunding 
strategy is to take into account relevant factors. For 
instance, when an operator determines the amount of 
refunds to an FH, he may investigate whether the femtocell 
is worthy of accessing, how many data rates it can provide, 
and how much profits it can make from admitted users. 
Similarly, the FH faces the following dilemma. On the one 
hand, an FH is willing to obtain some refunds by sharing 
spare access resources to MNO and MVNO. On the other 
hand, he may also worry about the negative influence on the 
network performance if sharing resources only to the one 
who offers higher refunds, as he cannot ensure that the 
admitted users will not degrade his own communication 
service. Therefore, femtocell access permission is indeed 
the access resource allocation problem, in which FHs 
allocate appropriate access resources to requesting users 
according to channel conditions and the amount of refunds 
provided by MNO and MVNO. In order to maximize own 
utility, every participant should employ reasonable strategy. 
B. Refunding Strategy Function and Price-Coefficient 
In general, when network operators initiate access request 
by refunding, they always make decision complying with 
some laws on technology and market. For instance, at the 
beginning of refunding, operators are positive to trade 
access resources by using large amount of refunds if they 
have sufficient capital. However, with the growth of 
admitted users, FAP may provide poor indoor access for 
new requesting users. This may lead to decrease on the 
benefits if operators keep high refunds. Hence, operators 
may decrease the refunding amount when the FAP have 
permitted many UEs. Based on this observation, we propose 
refunding strategy function (RSF) of operators as: 
log ( 1)R B xα= + ,                         (9) 
where B represents the refund base satisfying ncomeB I=  
nvestmentI− , in which ncomeI  denotes the earnings of the 
operator from total business; nvestmentI denotes the 
fundamental expenditure of the operators for infrastructure 
or operation. Obviously, B  is an indicator to reflect the 
capital quantity of the operator. x  represents the fraction of 
access resources allocated to an operator. α  denotes the 
price-coefficient, which indicates the refunding strategy of 
operators. The RSF actually reflects the trend of refunding 
amount versus the number of admitted UEs in network 
operator’s perspective. Considering the value of this 
function is non-negative and increasing, we have 0B ≥ , 
1α > , and 0 1x< < . 
However, in our system model, the competition for 
access resources exists between MNO and MVNO. Even if 
having same refund base and allocated access resource, 
MNO and MVNO are still capable of adopting different 
strategy dynamically to change the amount of refunds. 
Based on these considerations, we design price-coefficient 
as refunding strategy form of operators. The network 
operators change the value of price-coefficient in RSF to 
generate different refunding amount. Therefore we have the 
refunding amount of MNO and MVNO respectively as  
( )log
MMNO M m
R B α Φ= +1 ,                       (10) 
 ( )log VMVNO V nR B α Φ= +1 ,                       (11) 
where MB and VB denote the refund base of MNO and 
MVNO respectively; Mα and Vα denote the price-
coefficient of MNO and MVNO respectively. 
C. Utility Maximization 
As mentioned before, both MNO and MVNO are willing 
to pay refunds to the FH on the basis of obtaining benefits 
from indoor data rate improvement. From the financial 
perspective, the utility of network operators consists of two 
parts: one is the income contributed by providing indoor 
data service to the admitted UEs in FAP, and the other is the 
expense as funds paid to FH. For the selfishness and 
rationality, operators are delighted to maximize their own 
utility. Therefore, we formulate the utility maximization 
problem for MNO and MVNO respectively as follows: 
 ( ) ( )2max max[ log 1 log 1 ]M
M M
MNO M m M M mU B α
α α
ω Φ η Φ= + − + ,  (12) 
  ( ) ( )2max max[ log 1 log 1 ]V
V V
MVNO V n V V nU B α
α α
ω Φ η Φ= + − + .   (13) 
As some factors, including equivalent revenue on one 
unit data rate, refund base, and SINR threshold, may be 
considered constant for a time period of interest, we define 
Mα  and Vα  as optimization variable for the utility 
maximization problems (12) and (13) when the allocated 
fractions mΦ  and nΦ  are generally given. 
On the other hand, the FH divides the access resources of 
FAP into three parts: pΦ , mΦ  and nΦ . As 1p m nΦ Φ Φ+ + = , 
pΦ  can be represented as 1 m nΦ − Φ− . So, the FH may assign 
appropriate value for mΦ  and nΦ  to allocate the spare access 
resources to MNO and MVNO according to the refunding 
amount. Thus we can formulate the problem of FH utility 
maximization as follows:  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2, ,
max max[ 1 log 1
           log 1 log 1 ]
m n m n
M V
FH F m n F
M m V n
U
B B
Φ Φ Φ Φ
α α
ω Φ Φ η
Φ Φ
= − − +
+ + + +
.        (14) 
In (14), we define mΦ  and nΦ  as the optimization 
variables for the utility maximization problem of FH. 
IV. STACKELBERG GAME ANALYSIS 
Since every participant in the access permission is selfish 
and rational to maximize their own utility, we formulate the 
access permission as a Stackelberg game, in which MNO 
and MVNO are leaders and the FH is follower. Obviously, 
the game consists of two phases. The first one is the refunds 
compensation of MNO and MVNO, and the second one is 
the access resource allocation of the FH.  We then utilize 
back induction method to prove the existence of the Nash 
Equilibrium for the Stackelberg game. 
 A. Best Response of FH 
The utility of FH is a function with two optimization 
variables mΦ   and nΦ , which represent the strategy of FH in 
the game, denoted by { },m nΦ Φ . When received the 
information of price-coefficients Mα  and Vα from MNO 
and MVNO, the FH makes best response { }* *,m nΦ Φ  to 
allocate the access resources. 
Proposition: Given price-coefficients Mα and Vα , the 
best response of the FH is given by 
{ }* *, 1, 1
ln ln
M V
m n
F M F V
B B
A A
Φ Φ
α α
  
= − −   
 ,  
2
2
M M
F F
V V
F F
B B
A A
M
B B
A A
V
e e
e e
α
α

< <
< <
 .  (15) 
Proof: For the simplicity of notation, we define 
2log (1 )F F FA ω η= + , 
2log (1 )M M MA ω η= + , 2log (1 )V V VA ω η= + . 
The first order partial derivatives of FHU with respect to  
mΦ  and nΦ  respectively are 
              
1
ln 1
1
ln 1
FH M
F
m M m
FH V
F
n V n
U BA
U BA
∂
= − + ∗ ∂ α +∂
= − + ∗ ∂ α +
Φ Φ
Φ Φ
 .               (16) 
The mixed and second order partial derivatives of 
FHU  with respect to mΦ  and nΦ  are 
              ( )
( )
2
2
22
2
22
0
1
ln 1
1
ln 1
FH
m n
FH M
m M m
FH V
n V n
U
U B
U B
 ∂ =∂ ∂∂ −
= ∗ ∂ α +∂ −
= ∗ ∂ α +
Φ Φ
Φ Φ
Φ Φ
  .                  (17) 
As operators are willing to pay refunds for access 
resources only for the situation of having positive capital 
quantity, we have 0MB > , 0VB > . Furthermore, we have 
ln 0Mα >  and ln 0Vα >  as 1Mα >  and 1Vα > . Hence the 
following conditions, which guarantee the existence of 
maximum utility, are satisfied: 
    
22 2 2
2 2
2
2
0
0
FH FH FH
m n m n
FH
m
U U U
U
 ∂ ∂ ∂
− ∗ < ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
∂
< ∂
Φ Φ Φ Φ
Φ  
 .            (18) 
Therefore, the maximization of FHU  is achieved by 
solving the following equations: 
             
*
*
1* 0
ln 1
1* 0
ln 1
M
F
M m
V
F
V n
BA
BA
α Φ
α Φ

− + = +
− + = +
 .                  (19) 
Finally, we obtain the solution as: 
{ }* *, 1, 1
ln ln
M V
m n
F M F V
B B
A A
Φ Φ
α α
  
= − −   
.            (20) 
As 1m0 < Φ <  and 1n0 < Φ <  according to their 
definitions, the solution has to satisfy the following 
conditions: 
           
0 1 1
ln
0 1 1
ln
M
F M
V
F V
B
A
B
A
α
α

< − < < − <
 .                        (21) 
Therefore, the constraints of obtaining the best response 
for the FH is given by 
                     
2
2
M F M F
V F V F
B A B A
M
B A B A
V
e e
e e
α
α
 < <
< <
 .                      (22) 
Proof completes. 
B. Best Response of MNO and MVNO 
As leaders in the game, both MNO and MVNO will try to 
select their strategy to maximize their own utility while 
taking into account the best response of the FH. For given 
{ }* *,m nΦ Φ , MNO and MVNO can make their best response 
*
Mα and *Vα  independently to generate their refunding 
amount. For the similarity of utility maximization for both 
MNO and MVNO, we present the solution procedure for 
MNO only in the following. 
Proposition: Given { }* *,m nΦ Φ , the best response of MNO 
is given by  
 ( / 1)**
M
A AM F
F
B
A e
M e
−
=α ,  [ 1/ (2 ln ) / 1]
ln
M M FA AM
F M
B e
A
α
α
− + − +< .    (23) 
Proof: Substituting the best response of FH into the 
utility function of MNO yields 
 ( )
1 log 1 1
ln ln
ln ln
*
ln ln
M
M M
MNO M M
F M F M
M F MM M
M M
F M M
B BU A B
A A
B AA B B A
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   
= − − − +      
= − −
 .  (24) 
The first and second order derivatives of MNOU  are 
respectively: 
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( )2
ln ln
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M F M F M F MMNO
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 .    (26) 
In order to obtain the maximum utility of MNO, the 
second order derivative of MNOU  has to be negative. Since 
ln 0Mα > , 0MB > , 0FA > , we transform the proof of 
2/ 0MNO MU α∂ ∂ <   into the proof of inequality as follows: 
( )
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 <
 . (27) 
In fact, it is impossible to obtain analytical solution for 
Mα  in (27). Fortunately, we can prove that the inequality in 
(27) is satisfied easily in some value domain. For example, 
when M eα =  , we can derive a new inequality as follows: 
 ( )
( )2 3
ln 2 3
0 M F
M F M F
A A
M F
B A A A
B A e −
< −
 < <  .                      (28) 
Obviously, (28) is feasible in the value domain of MB , 
MA  and FA . Thus, 2/ 0MNO MU α∂ ∂ < is satisfied. 
Furthermore, letting / 0MNO MU α∂ ∂ = ,  we can obtain the 
solution as best response of MNO as follows: 
( / 1)**
M
A AM F
F
B
A e
M e
−
=α .                            (29) 
Proof completes. 
Using the similar method, we can obtain the best 
response of MVNO as 
( )( )/ 1** A AV FV FB A e
V eα
−
=  on the condition 
( )1/ 2 ln / 1ln V V FA AV F VB A e
α
α
 − + − + < . 
On the basis of positivity, monotonicity and scalability of 
respective best response [10], we conclude that FH, MNO 
and MVNO achieve the Nash Equilibrium. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF ACCESS PERMISSION 
In this section, we describe implementation of the 
refunding policy for access permission. It allows every 
participant to achieve their own utility maximization, and 
reach Nash Equilibrium in two steps. 
A. Information Collection 
In order to select appropriate strategy, MNO and MVNO 
have to acquire information about Fω , Mω , Vω , Fη , Mη  and 
Vη . Among these factors, Fω , Mω  and Vω  can be readily 
obtained from historical data analysis as they can keep 
stable in a time period of interest. However, it is difficult for 
operators to obtain Fη , Mη  and Vη , as they are varying in 
wireless networks  and need to be measured. The best way 
to solve this problem is that the FAP collects these factors 
periodically. FAP is able to measure the SINR of every UEs 
in the coverage and compute the average value as threshold 
for each kind of UEs (including SUEs, T-MUEs, and V-
MUEs). Obviously, FAP also needs to send this information 
to MNO and MVNO to help them make decisions. Internet 
backhaul link between FAP and network operators can be 
used for this information collection.  
As for FH, Mα  and Vα  are crucial factors to make 
appropriate resource allocation. FH receives Mα  and Vα   
separately from operators. Together with the previous 
measured Fη , the appropriate allocation scheme can be 
determined.  Moreover, as MB  and VB  are relatively static, 
we can initialize the value when refunding operation begins.    
B. Procedure of Access Permission  
On basis of collected factors, the FH and network 
operators perform the following steps for access permission:  
1) Initialize Fω , Mω , Vω , MB and VB  when the refunding 
mechanism starts in hybrid access permission.  
2) The FAP measures the SINR of every UE in its coverage 
area, and classify these SINRs according to different 
affiliation of UEs.  
3) The FAP gathers the different kinds of SINRs and 
computes the average values as thresholds for every 
kind, such as Fη , Mη  and Vη . If the SINR of UEs is 
lower than corresponding threshold of the same UE type, 
these UEs are rejected for access. The rest UEs are 
marked as permitted T-MUEs and V-MUEs. 
4) The FAP sends Mη and Vη to MNO and MVNO 
respectively by using Internet backhaul link.  
5) MNO and MVNO receive Mη  and Vη , and compute Mα  
and Vα respectively. If 
( )1/ 2 ln / 1ln V V FA AM F MB A e
α
α
 − + − + <  
and   
( )1/ 2 ln / 1/ ln V V FA AV F VB A e
α
α
 − + − + <   are satisfied, MNO 
and MVNO feedback Mα and Vα to FAP. Otherwise, 
MNO and MVNO return 0, which means that MNO and 
MVNO give up the access request. 
6) The FAP receives Mα and Vα reported from MNO and 
MVNO, and examines whether 2M F M FB A B AMe eα< <  and 
2V F V FB A B A
Ve eα< < are satisfied first. If these conditions 
are satisfied, FAP computes mΦ  and nΦ , and allocates 
the resources to permitted T-MUEs and V-MUEs.   
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
In this section, we conduct simulation experiments to 
validate the effectiveness of our proposed scheme on access 
permission of hybrid femtocell.  
A. Scenario and Parameters 
The simulation scenario and system settings are as 
follows. There is a FAP with fixed coverage radius of 100m 
and transmission power of 33dBm. Some active SUEs, T-
MUEs and V-MUEs are randomly distributed around the 
FAP. The number of SUEs is set to 5P = , the number of T-
MUEs is 15M = , and the number of V-MUEs is 10N = . As 
SUEs are usually served by FAP with higher priority and 
better service quality, we set the distance (transformed from 
SINR threshold) from SUEs to FAP to follow Gaussian 
distribution with mean 60m and variance 10. Similarly, the 
distance from T-MUEs or V-MUEs to FAP follows 
Gaussian distribution with mean 80m and variance 10. 
Considering the difference on capital quantity between 
MNO and MVNO, the refund base of MNO is set 
to 15MB = , and the refund base of MVNO is set to 10VB = . 
Accordingly, as each participant of the game may have 
different equivalent revenue on unit data rate, we set 
3Fω = , 4Mω =  and 3.5Vω = . These parameters of 
equivalent revenue and refund base may vary for further 
analysis. 
B. Numerical Results and Discussions 
In the first simulation experiment, we investigate the 
social welfare of our proposed refunding policy, where the 
social welfare is defined as the sum of every participant’s 
utility in the access permission. We compare the propsoed 
refunding policy for applying to three access modes for 
femtocell: open, closed, and hybrid modes. We set 0mΦ =  
and 0nΦ = for close access mode. Consider that the open 
access mode has random allocation scheme, we simulate a 
typical scenario in which SUEs are dominant and occupy 
50% of total resoruces, the rest resources are allcated 
equally to MNO and MVNO, i.e. 0.25mΦ =  and 0.25nΦ = . 
In hybrid access, the FAP would select appropriate 
allocation scheme dynamically according to real time 
wireless environment and announced price-coefficients 
from MNO and MVNO. Fig.2 shows the social werlfare for 
three access modes. From Fig.2, we can see that the social 
 welfare for hybrid access is the highest as the utilitiy of 
every participant is improved compared with that for closed 
access and open access. Although selecting a typical value 
for the simulation of open access mode, FH still prefers to 
adopt hybrid access in other conditions because of less 
handover and signaling overhead. 
 
Fig.2. Comparison of social welfare    Fig.3. Allocated resource versus ω  
In the second experiment, we investigate the change of 
obtained resources of operators when the equivalent 
revenue on unit data rate of operators varies. From Fig.3, 
we can find an interesting phenomenon. Both of two curves 
show that when an operator keeps his equivalent revenue 
unchanged, another operator may obtain more access 
resources than his opponent by increasing the equivalent 
revenue. We also find that once an operator realizes the 
opponent’s strategy and selects the same strategy, the 
dominant one may lose the advantage, because two curves 
in Fig.3 overlap approximately. Hence, the reasonable way 
for network operators to obtain more resources than 
opponent is providing differentiated services rather than 
merely increasing service price. 
(a) Allocated resource versus refund base   (b) Best price-coefficient versus 
refund base  
  Fig.4. Allocated resources and price-coefficient vesrsus refund base 
Finally, we investigate the influence of refund base on 
best response of FH (allocated resources to MNO and 
MVNO respectively), and best responses of MNO and 
MVNO (best price-coefficients). From Fig.4 (a), we find 
that FH may not be sensitive to the refund base, as the 
amount of allocated resources of MNO and MVNO both 
keep relatively stable when operators increase their refund 
base. It indicates that the capital quantity of MNO and 
MVNO cannot affect FH to allocate access resources. From 
Fig.4 (b), we find that the best price-coefficients of both 
MNO and MVNO increase when operators increase their 
refund base. As the capital quantity of MNO is larger than 
that of MVNO, the best price-coefficient of MNO is smaller 
than that of MVNO. It indicates that MNO is indeed 
aggressive and may pay more refunds than MVNO for the 
same amount of resources.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have investigated the competition 
between MNO and MVNO in the access permission of 
hybrid femtocell network. We have proposed a refunding 
policy to motivate FH to allocate appropriate access 
resources to MNO and MVNO according to their refunding 
amount. In the refunding policy, we designed refunding 
strategy function to describe the relationship between the 
refunding amount and attained resource, and defined price-
coefficient to reflect the refunding strategy diversity of 
MNO and MVNO. With the help of Stackelberg game 
analysis, we concluded that MNO, MVNO and FH can 
maximize their utility by reaching a unique Nash 
Equilibrium in the access permission. A feasible procedure 
of access permission has been proposed to guide every 
participant to make appropriate strategy by collecting 
necessary information about system. Simulation results 
have illustrated that proposed refunding policy improves the 
social welfare of network, and every participant achieves 
the win-win situation by appropriate resource allocation. 
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